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Abstract 
 
 
Employing a probit and Logit model, this paper demonstrates that small firm 
development, conceived of in terms of structural, behavior and performance features, is 
correlated with regional location in Poland.  Regional GDP is also shown to be 
polarizing. The paper uses original data that samples the small firm stratum in two 
contrasting regions, Gdansk and Lublin. The following variables were shown to be 
significantly correlated with regional location: legal structure, subcontracting, 
technological level of the products of the firm, average wage and intention to expand 
turnover. Policy implications are  discussed including the desirability of a regionally 
differentiated small firm policy that reflects the level of small firm development in a 
particular region. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The specific objective of this paper is to formulate and test a novel hypothesis in a 
transitional economy, Poland. This country is characterized by the spatial and economic 
differentiation of what has been called Poland A and Poland  B  - the former more 
developed, industrialized and closer to the EU, the latter less developed, more agrarian 
and closer to Russia.  We have chosen two regions representative of Poland A and B
1
 - 
Gdansk and Lublin - and sample small firm development in both. We test our hypothesis 
by using a probit analysis discovering the correlation between Structure-Conduct-
Performance (S-C-P)
2
 features of small firms and their regional location.  Faster growing 
regions (in terms of GDP per capita) within such an economy are expected to produce 
firms that have a more developed range of S-C-P features from firms in less developed 
regions. To the best of our knowledge, such an analysis has not been attempted before. 
 
The context for this paper is the impressive growth of Polish GDP post 1989 that was 
driven by the growth in small firms and accompanied by the growing regional disparities 
within Poland during the 1990s. By 1999 8.8 million people were working in the sector 
of which 46.5% were in small and medium enterprises. Regional development displayed 
uneven growth as more favoured regions with natural, market, geographic or historical 
advantages grew faster and growth was cumulatively generated (Kaldor 1970, Dixon and 
Thirlwall 1975). Fig 1 shows a 30% difference in 1995 between the GDP per capita of 
the Gdansk and Lublin regions which widened to 46% by the year 2000. Fig 2 shows 
comparable figures for the differences between Poland A and B: a 30% difference 
between the averaged GDP per capita of their regions in 1995 widening to 40% by 2000. 
Dramatic regional polarisation has been occurring in Poland in the lead up to EU 
accession.  The motivation of the paper is to test if  S-C-P differences in small firm 
development are related to the regions they inhabit. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the empirical analysis. Section 3 
discusses the variables found to be significant in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
discusses policy implications. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Both regions are part of sample suggested by Piasecki et alia (2000) as representative of Poland A and B. 
Berger et al (1998) also note these structural differences in the Polish space. 
2 The term S-C-P is  loosely based on the S-C-P model of micro economics. Here we refer to a range of 
structural factors (including legal structure), conduct factors (e.g. networking, research, human capital 
policy ) and performance features (productivity, profits, turnover for example). 
 2.  Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section we outline the empirical modelling of regional differences in Poland. First 
we discuss the econometric method to be employed for inference followed by a 
discussion of the data and then we present and interpret the estimation results.  
 
2.1 Econometric methodology  
 
The dependent variable (denoted Yi) that we model is dichotomous, taking the value of 
zero for firms in the Polish region of Lublin (Yi = 0) and unity for those in Gdansk (Yi = 
1). Application of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inappropriate because it 
would induce heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the model. Further, the predicted 
values of the dependant variable would not necessarily be constrained to fall within the 
range of zero and one giving rise to nonsense probability values and negative variances 
(Greene, 2000, p. 813). The appropriate specification to employ in these circumstances is 
a binary choice model including the standard probit and logit models. Since there is no 
theoretical reason for favouring the probit over the logit form (or vice versa) and there is 
typically little difference in the results obtained from the two forms (Greene, 2000, p. 
815) we focus on the probit model.  
 
We hypothesise that a range of factors (denoted by the matrix X), including economic 
characteristics, can be used to ascertain regional location. The probit model specifies the 
probability that Yi takes on any particular value, Y, (denoted as Pr[Yi = Y]) as: 
 
 X 
Pr[Yi = 1] = (X) =  (s) ds  (2.1a) 
  
– 
  X 
Pr[Yi = 0] = 1 – (X) = 1 –  (s) ds  (2.1b) 
  
– 
 
where  is the vector of parameters corresponding to X, () denotes the (non-cumulated 
normal) distribution and () is the cumulative normal distribution.3 Using the normal 
distribution the probit model transforms the values of X, that are defined over the 
infinite interval (– < X < ), into probabilities that are weakly bounded by zero and 
one (0  Pr[Yi = Y]  1). Thus, all probabilities take on sensible values and variances 
cannot be negative. 
 
The probability model for the probit specification, given equation (2.1a) and (2.1b), is 
(where y is the vector representation of the observations on the dependent variable Yi):  
 
 
                                               
3 For the probit model one employs the normal distribution thus:  (s) ds = [1 / (2)]  exp{–½s2} ds. A 
different distribution is used for the logit form [and, indeed, the gompit (extreme value) form]. 
 1 
E(y  X) =  {Yi  Pr[Yi]} = {0  [1 – (X)]} + {1  (X)} = (X)  (2.2) 
 
Yi=0 
 
The parameters of this model, as with any non-linear specification, do not necessarily 
yield the marginal effects [Greene (2000) p. 815]. For the probit model the marginal 
effects are obtained from the following expression:
4
 
 
 E(y  X) / X =  (X) / X = (X)  (2.3) 
 
Strictly this expression is only correct when the explanatory variable of interest is 
continuous. However, ―taking the derivative with respect to the binary variable as if it 
were continuous provides an approximation that is often surprisingly accurate‖ (Greene 
(2000) p. 817).
5
 
 
2.2 Data and Variables 
 
Our analysis  is based on primary survey data  obtained by direct interviews via a detailed 
questionnaire in the small firm stratum of Gdansk and Lublin  in 1999. They were part of 
a research programme ―An Empirical Study of Small and Medium Size Enterprises in 
Poland: Phase 11‖.6 Small firms were defined as employing between 10 and 49 
employees
7
 and most of the NACE sector categories  (industry, trade, construction, 
transport and services) were included in the population. The questionnaires consisted of 
58 general questions many of which had sub-sections. Considerable data was collected. 
Professional enumerators  were employed to ensure maximum quality and minimum non-
sampling error.  The sampling technique used a proportionate stratification sampling 
method across the chosen sectors. Micro enterprises with less than 10 employees were 
not included since such data was not regarded as reliable. For the purpose of the model 
twenty-nine variables were chosen on both practical and theoretical grounds. These are 
presented in Table 1 in the appendix. Not all variables from the original 58 questions 
were suitable for measurement and inclusion in our model. There were some variables for 
which accurate data was inherently difficult to obtain in small firm interviews (e.g. profit 
levels). We use 163 data points (74 firms from Gdansk and 89 from Lublin). The choice 
of our twenty-nine variables was based upon economic reasoning concerning their likely 
influences upon small firm‘s differential regional development.  
                                               
4 Let u = X  (X) = (u), by the chain rule it follows that,  (X) / X = {u / X}  { (X) / 
u}. Then, u / X =  (X) / X =  and  (X) / u =  (X) / (X) = (X) – the latter arises 
because (X) =  (s) ds. Therefore,  (X) / X = (X). 
5 The marginal effect of a particular variable is typically calculated in one of two ways. First, one can 
evaluate (X) in (3.3) using the sample means of the explanatory variables and multiply the result by . 
Second, (X) in (3.3) can be calculated at every observation of the sample, the average series is then 
generated and the result multiplied by . Greene (2000) p. 816 suggests that current practice favours the 
latter method, hence this is the method that we use to calculate marginal effects (slopes). 
6  These surveys were financed by the European commissions PHARE ACE PROGRAMME 1997, 
Contract Number p97-8123-R. 
7  The small firm definition  (10-49 employees) is in accord with the EU and  also with recent Polish 
legislation (1999): ―Law on Economic Activity‖. 
 2.3 Potential Determinants of Regional Differences 
 
The full name of each of the 29 variables is given in Table 4.  Economic reasoning 
indicted the choice and significance of these variables. It was expected that they would 
all be positively correlated with the regional location of Gdansk since this is the more 
dynamic and growing region. Thus firms were expected to have more advanced legal 
status, greater networking experience (e.g. subcontracting), higher levels of technology, 
organization change of the firm and its products, greater levels of revenue, profits and 
wages indicating productivity differences between the regions
8
. Gdansk firms were 
expected to be more oriented to foreign trade, investment and collaboration and to have 
higher levels of preparation for and expectation of gain from Europe. They were expected 
to use greater levels of franchising, credit, to have higher levels of training provision and 
the like.  In general we expected a more dynamic small firm stratum in the Gdansk 
region. However, some of these variables are not significant in the final results due to a 
loss of information in our choice of final model and multicollinearity. However what we 
expected from the results was that a group of significant variables would emerge 
indicating that the Structure-Conduct-Performance features of small firms was regionally 
differentiated.  
 
 
2.4 Empirical results 
 
Table 1 reports the probit model estimation results. The general specification (Model 1) 
regresses the dependant variable on 29 explanatory variables (in addition to the intercept) 
taken from the original Polish firm survey. 163 observations are used to estimate the 
model with 74 from the Gdansk region and 89 from Lublin. There is no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation or non-normally distributed residuals at the 5% level 
of significance for any of the three models reported in Table 1, except for Model 1 where 
non-normality is evident.
9
 However, non-normality is not evident at the 1% level for 
Model 1 suggesting that the departure from normality is not excessively severe and that 
the critical values employed for hypothesis testing will provide useful guidance. Further, 
                                               
8 Gdansk has a 40%  industrial productivity advantage over Lublin - author's calculations from GUS data, 
Warsaw. 
9 The test for heteroscedasticity is outlined in, for example, the E-Views User Guide pp. 421. It tests the 
null of homoscedasticity against the alternative that heteroscedasticity takes the form, i
2 = exp(2zi‘), 
where zi is a vector of variables that the variance of the binary choice model, i
2, varies with and  is the 
corresponding coefficient vector. The auxiliary test equation is:  
 
 ^    ^  ^ ^    ^    ^  ^ 
{(Yi – Pi) / [Pi(1 – Pi)]} = {(X) / [Pi(1 – Pi)]}X + {(X)(X) / [Pi(1 – Pi)]}Z + vi  
    ^ 
where Pi denotes the fitted probability value and  and  are coefficient vectors. The test statistic is the 
explained sum of squares of the above auxiliary regression which is distributed with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of variables in the Z matrix (the matrix counterpart of zi). In our application we use all 
of the variables in the X matrix, less the intercept, in the Z matrix. Thus the degrees of freedom are k‘ = k – 
1, where k denotes the number of variables in the X matrix. 
because non-normality is not evident in the other models, inferences from these models 
will be valid.  
 
In Model 1 five of the variables are statistically significant (not including the intercept 
which is also significant) and feature the expected sign. However, because the other 
twenty-four variables are insignificantly different from zero, we pursue model reduction 
to clarify the results and enhance efficiency of estimation. We employ the standard 
general-to-specific methodology by sequentially deleting the least significant variables 
(being reticent to exclude those that are regarded as most theoretically important) until 
we achieve a parsimonious specification. We obtain two different parsimonious models: 
Model 2 and Model 3.  
 
The removal of 24 variables from Model 1 to yield Model 2 is valid according to an F-
test [F(1)] at the 5% level (the probability value is 0.803). Model 2 incorporates 5 
explanatory variables in addition to the intercept. They are the firm‘s legal status 
(Lstatus), the percentage of the firm‘s output that is subcontracted (Subcon) and whether 
the enterprise has introduced technologically improved goods (Newgoods). Also included 
are whether the firm intends to expand turnover (Turnover) and average gross wages 
(Avewage). All variables are statistically significant at the 5% level with z-statistics 
greater than 1.96 in magnitude, except Lstatus which has a z-statistic of 1.921 (which is 
virtually significant). All five variables feature the expected positive correlation with the 
dependent variable. Model 2 explains 30.5% of the variation in the dependent variable 
and this explanatory power is statistically significant, according to the LR statistic, at the 
5% level.
10
 The regression standard error is 0.412 which is approximately the average 
error of the model.  
 
The removal of 25 variables from Model 1 to yield Model 3 is valid according to an F-
test [F(1)] at the 5% level (the probability value is 0.616). Model 3 incorporates 4 
explanatory variables in addition to the intercept, they are Subcon, Newgoods, Turnover 
and Avewage. All four variables feature the expected positive sign and are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Model 3 explains 28.8% of the variation in the dependent 
variable and this explanatory power is statistically significant, according to the LR 
statistic, at the 5% level. The regression standard error is 0.416.  
 
In both Model 2 and Model 3 all of the retained variables' coefficients exhibit the 
expected positive sign, the exclusion restrictions are valid and there is no evident 
misspecification. Although all of the retained variables in Model 3 are individually 
significant, Model 2 has a better fit, a lower AIC (=1.031) and includes the additional 
variable Lstatus, which is almost significant. Hence we favour Model 2 for inference and 
argue that Lstatus may be considered an important explanatory factor of regional 
differences in Poland. We therefore conclude that the variables that explain regional 
                                               
10 The pseudo R2 (or likelihood ratio index) is defined as: pseudo R2 = 1 – (lnL / lnL0), where lnL and lnL0 
are the maximised values of the model‘s likelihood function including all variables and only incorporating 
an intercept, respectively – see Greene (2000, p 831). Clearly, if all the slope coefficients are zero then lnL 
equals lnL0 and the pseudo R
2 is zero. Perfect fit can only be obtained if lnL is zero (the log of the 
likelihood function attaining the maximum value of one). 
differences in Polish firms are as follows. The firm‘s legal status (Lstatus), the percentage 
of the firm‘s output that is subcontracted (Subcon), whether the enterprise has introduced 
technologically improved goods (Newgoods), whether the firm intends to expand 
turnover (Turnover) and average gross wages (Avewage). 
 
To determine whether these inferences are robust to the different forms of binary choice 
model used we report the estimation results of Model 1 to 3 using the logit and gompit 
(extreme value) forms in tables 2 and 3, respectively. The inferences are qualitatively 
similar to those obtained for the probit formulation, reported in table 1. Although the 
coefficients are different for each model across the three forms of binary choice model, 
this is expected because the coefficients do not measure the marginal effects (slopes) of 
the variables.
11
 However, the slopes for each model across all three binary choice forms 
are virtually the same – except for the variable Qexport in the general specification, 
Model 1, which has a poorly determined coefficient. Hence, the results are robust across 
the three different types of binary choice model, which enhances our confidence in the 
inferences obtained. 
 
 
3. Explanation of significant variables 
 
Our significant variables indicate that the S-C-P features of small firms in Poland are 
regionally differentiated.  
 
That the legal status of Gdansk's small firms tends to be significantly different from that 
of Lublin's , with more firms at the higher end of the free market development spectrum, 
indicates structural differences between firms in the two regions.
12
 Firms that are legally 
structured as limited companies, for example, are more likely to survive, to raise finance, 
to be larger in size, more specialised, technologically more advanced than sole traders. 
The legal structure of a company is therefore indicative of a raft of structural differences 
between small firms. Very importantly, more advanced legal structures of small firms 
imply higher levels of corporate governance which are positively related to productivity 
levels of the small firm (Cowling 2003). 
 
Subcontracting proved a significant difference between small firms in the two regions 
indicating differing regional behaviour of firms in response to competitive dynamics. In 
fact in the survey Gdansk engaged in seven times more subcontracting than Lublin. Once 
again this variable is indicative of a range of behavioral features. The firm that is 
subcontracting is clearly more networked and connected than a firm that is not. Such a 
firm is knowledgeable about the "rules of engagement" with larger firms, some of them 
probably foreign. This firm is probably more advanced in information technology and has 
access to more contracts than other less "connected" firms. It is possibly part of a cluster 
                                               
11 For example, Greene (2000) p. 817 suggests that one needs to multiply the coefficients on the probit 
model by the factor 1.6 to obtain values comparable to the logit form. 
12 The spectrum of legal ownership in our questionnaire was as follows: state owned enterprise, communal 
enterprise, co-operative, individual's business (sole enterprise), partnership, trade law partnership, joint 
stock Ltd, other. The legal structure of a firm reflects other developmental levels of the firm. 
arrangement and its associated benefits (Schmitz 1992).  It is likely to be more flexible 
and responsive to change than other firms. It is also likely to have more credit accessible 
to it since the more a firm is part of cluster of interrelated firms that "know" one another 
the more likely such a firm is to receive trade credit, or access references for bank credit. 
Such connectivity and transparency is not available to the more isolated firm who will 
only have far more limited and expensive forms of credit available. Since credit is a 
general constraint on small firm development in Poland (as well as many other countries) 
then sub-contracting is indicative ways of overcoming this (Ghatak, Mulhern and 
Stewart, 2003; Petersen and Rajan 1997). 
 
The performance features of small firms in the two regions show a number of telling 
differences. The significant variables emerging from the study - the technological level of 
the products of the firm, the average wage, and intention to expand turnover - point to a 
range of clear differences between firms in the two regions. Gdansk's small firms are 
more likely to have a higher technological level of their products indicating greater 
productivity advances in this region.
13
  The higher average wage of the Gdansk small 
firms should be correlated with the expected higher marginal productivity of labour, 
while the intention to expand turnover indicates the existence of higher profit levels
14
 of 
the Gdansk firms and points once again the productivity differential between the two 
regions.
 15
   
 
 
4. Policy implications 
 
This paper develops a link between small firm development and regional analysis in 
transitional economies. It has been shown to have evidence supporting it in two Polish 
diverging regions that are representative of wider regional divisions in the country. 
Conceptually it leans towards a view of the firm that emphasises the qualitative nature of 
its organisation and behaviour (Penrose 1956).  
 
With respect to regional policy, programmes that apply across the national space have 
probably limited impact since the needs of small firms in very underdeveloped regions 
are very different from those in developed areas. Indeed there has been growing criticism 
of both the failure Business Support Centres in Eastern Europe (Bateman 2000) and  the 
international, imported nature of so called local regional small firm programmes in 
Poland (Piasecka and Rainnie 2000). Specifically with regard to Poland it is also clear 
that the rate of regional polarization is increasing rapidly. This paper emphasizes the 
qualitative level of small firm's development in different regions of a transitional 
                                               
13 See Acs and Audretsch (1990) and Carlsson (1991) for the capacity of small firms to capture market 
share through productivity and innovation advances. 
14 "Intentionality" is linked to past and future performance (Pistrui et alia 2002) 
15 In economic theory the real wage is equal to the marginal product of labour in order for profit to be 
maximised. In the Cobb-Douglas framework also wage growth and profits are linked to productivity 
growth (McCann 2001 p241-2). 
economy like Poland. Regional policy that addresses the specific deficiencies in S-C-P 
level of small firms will be more promising than generic strategies.
16
 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the determinants of differences in Polish firms in the regions 
of Gdansk and Lublin using a probit model. Of the twenty-nine potential determinants we 
found that five could explain significant differences between the two regions. These are 
the firm‘s legal status, the percentage of the firm‘s output that is subcontracted, whether 
the enterprise has introduced technologically improved goods, whether the firm intends to 
expand turnover and average gross wages. It demonstrates the existence of a correlation 
between small firm development, conceived of in terms of Structure-Conduct-
Performance, and regional location in Poland. Further research is needed to explore its 
relevance to other transitional economies. Policy implications are suggested that 
especially point to the desirability of a regionally differentiated small firm policy. 
                                               
16 See Mulhern (2003) for example of  how such qualitative measures might be used to target faster 
growing firms. 
  
 
Fig 1 
 
 
Source Authors' calculations from GUS data base. 
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Fig 2 
 
Source Authors' calculations from GUS data base 
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Table 1: Probit Regional Differences Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef z-stat Slope Coef z-stat Slope Coef z-stat Slope 
Intercept  –6.834 –2.871 — –6.211 –5.658 — –4.931 –6.039 — 
Lstatus  0.343 2.107 0.081 0.249 1.921 0.067    
Sector –0.079 –0.097 –0.019       
Fcapital 0.007 0.545 0.002       
Subcon 0.021 2.974 0.005 0.015 3.360 0.004 0.015 3.348 0.004 
Qothereg –0.005 –0.901 –0.001       
Qexport 0.001 0.0767 0.0001       
Franchis 0.210 0.224 0.050       
Demand –0.220 –0.503 –0.052       
Comp –0.372 –0.510 –0.088       
Techprod 0.398 1.010 0.094       
Internet –0.182 –0.456 –0.043       
Newgoods 1.477 3.349 0.350 0.683 2.896 0.183 0.648 2.785 0.178 
Newmethd 1.062 2.309 0.251       
Neworg 0.676 1.531 0.160       
Newprop 1.713 1.242 0.405       
Exsupprt –1.131 –1.005 –0.268       
Farise –0.195 –0.648 –0.046       
Turnover 0.122 1.090 0.029 0.183 2.816 0.049 0.205 3.049 0.056 
Employed 0.009 0.473 0.002       
Empgrow 0.002 0.374 0.0004       
Humcap –0.269 –0.678 –0.064       
Avewage 0.003 3.943 0.001 0.003 5.255 0.001 0.003 5.253 0.001 
Trdunion 0.369 0.333 0.087       
Euaffect 0.071 0.258 0.017       
Eupreprn 0.216 0.509 0.051       
Loan2yrs –0.496 –1.727 –0.117       
Revenuef 0.077 0.509 0.018       
Prgrow98 0.004 0.862 0.001       
Profityr –0.304 –1.179 –0.072       
Summary          
Avg[(X)]   0.236   0.268   0.275 
Fit Stat Prob  Stat Prob  Stat Prob  
R2  0.386   0.305   0.288   
S 0.420   0.412   0.416   
AIC 1.215   1.031   1.042   
LR Statistic 86.600 0.000  68.569 0.000  64.688 0.000  
F(1)     0.739 0.803  0.891 0.616  
Misspec Stat Prob  Stat Prob  Stat Prob  
2(H,k‘) 16.805 0.965  3.679 0.596  4.184 0.382  
2(A,1) 0.207 0.649  0.002 0.967  0.069 0.793  
2(N,2) 8.790 0.012  1.371 0.504  1.003 0.606  
Avg[(X)] is the average value of the (X) series – the latter is calculated at the estimated value of  for each 
observation – which is employed in the calculation of the slope {slope =   Avg[(X)]}. R2 is the McFadden R2 and 
F(1) denotes the F-test for the exclusion of variables from model 1 to obtain the specified restricted form. 2(H,k‘) is 
a test for heteroscedasticity (discussed in the E-Views 4 User‘s Guide pp. 421–422) which is distributed with k‘ 
degrees of freedom, where k‘ is the number of variables in the estimated binary choice model excluding the intercept 
(model 1: k‘ = 29; model 2: k‘ = 5; model 3: k‘ = 4). 2(A,1) is the Ljung-Box test for first-order autocorrelation and 
2(N,2) denotes the Jarque-Bera test for non-normally distributed residuals. All coefficients are expected to be positive 
except Trdunion, which can take either sign. All regressions use 163 observations with the dependent variable taking 
the unit value for 74 observations (representing Gdansk) and 89 being zero (Lublin). All estimations were carried out 
using Eviews 4.1. 
Table 2: Logit Regional Differences Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef z-stat Slope Coef z-stat Slope Coef z-stat Slope 
Intercept  –11.857 –2.805 — –10.474 –5.296 — –8.272 –5.548 — 
Lstatus  0.591 2.053 0.083 0.440 1.939 0.070    
Sector –0.173 –0.119 –0.024       
Fcapital 0.013 0.561 0.002       
Subcon 0.036 2.930 0.005 0.025 3.236 0.004 0.025 3.233 0.004 
Qothereg –0.009 –0.903 –0.001       
Qexport –0.0001 –0.007 –1.172       
Franchis 0.367 0.232 0.052       
Demand –0.292 –0.379 –0.041       
Comp –0.525 –0.422 –0.074       
Techprod 0.706 1.059 0.099       
Internet –0.279 –0.412 –0.039       
Newgoods 2.503 3.231 0.352 1.164 2.870 0.186 1.062 2.691 0.175 
Newmethd 1.847 2.303 0.260       
Neworg 1.167 1.510 0.164       
Newprop 2.962 1.295 0.417       
Exsupprt –1.907 –1.017 –0.268       
Farise –0.350 –0.665 –0.049       
Turnover 0.206 1.100 0.029 0.306 2.836 0.049 0.335 3.047 0.055 
Employed 0.014 0.436 0.002       
Empgrow 0.003 0.415 0.0004       
Humcap –0.496 –0.731 –0.070       
Avewage 0.006 3.781 0.001 0.005 4.946 0.001 0.005 4.871 0.001 
Trdunion 0.679 0.359 0.013       
Euaffect 0.092 0.195 0.013       
Eupreprn 0.315 0.421 0.044       
Loan2yrs –0.842 –1.723 –0.118       
Revenuef 0.149 0.584 0.021       
Prgrow98 0.007 0.842 0.001       
Profityr –0.507 –1.147 –0.071       
Summary          
Avg[(X)]   0.141   0.160   0.165 
Fit Stat Prob  Stat Prob  Stat Prob  
R2  0.382   0.302   0.284   
s 0.420   0.416   0.417   
AIC 1.220   1.036   1.047   
LR Statistic 85.758 0.000  67.756 0.000  63.861 0.000  
F(1)     0.746 0.796  0.741 0.595  
Misspec Stat Prob  Stat Prob  Stat Prob  
2(H,k‘) 18.160 0.941  3.742 0.587  4.021 0.403  
2(A,1) 0.188 0.665  0.001 0.977  0.084 0.772  
2(N,2) 12.607 0.002  1.637 0.441  0.600 0.741  
All statistics are the same as in Table 1 except Avg[(X)] employs the logistic distribution rather than the normal 
distribution. 
Table 3: Gompit (Extreme Value) Regional Differences Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef z-stat Slope Coef z-stat Slope Coef z-stat Slope 
Intercept  –6.935 –2.628 — –6.182 –5.179 — –4.993 –5.772 — 
Lstatus  0.417 2.026 0.086 0.246 1.621 0.058    
Sector –0.027 –0.033 –0.006       
Fcapital 0.006 0.419 0.001       
Subcon 0.022 2.628 0.005 0.017 3.070 0.004 0.017 3.131 0.004 
Qothereg –0.003 –0.471 –0.001       
Qexport –0.001 –0.107 –0.0002       
Franchis 0.251 0.270 0.052       
Demand –0.396 –0.846 –0.082       
Comp –0.491 –0.624 –0.102       
Techprod 0.517 1.142 0.107       
Internet –0.275 –0.560 –0.057       
Newgoods 1.505 2.988 0.312 0.750 2.839 0.177 0.703 2.686 0.168 
Newmethd 0.960 1.829 0.199       
Neworg 0.676 1.399 0.140       
Newprop 1.652 1.048 0.342       
Exsupprt –1.274 –1.038 –0.264       
Farise –0.227 –0.669 –0.047       
Turnover 0.131 0.983 0.027 0.187 2.673 0.044 0.209 2.854 0.050 
Employed 0.016 0.631 0.003       
Empgrow 0.001 0.161 0.0002       
Humcap –0.270 –0.570 –0.056       
Avewage 0.004 3.676 0.001 0.003 5.290 0.001 0.003 5.316 0.001 
Trdunion 0.091 0.068 0.014       
Euaffect 0.069 0.216 0.014       
Eupreprn 0.316 0.686 0.065       
Loan2yrs –0.518 –1.588 –0.107       
Revenuef 0.073 0.411 0.015       
Prgrow98 0.006 0.925 0.001       
Profityr –0.417 –1.206 –0.086       
Summary          
Avg[(X)]   0.207   0.236   0.239 
Fit Stat Prob  Stat Prob  Stat Prob  
R2  0.381   0.304   0.292   
s 0.422   0.413   0.417   
AIC 1.221   1.032   1.037   
LR Statistic 85.556 0.000  68.302 0.000  65.489 0.000  
F(1)     0.731 0.812  0.851 0.671  
Misspec Stat Prob  Stat Prob  Stat Prob  
2(H,k‘) 31.712 0.333  4.253 0.514  2.508 0.643  
2(A,1) 0.147 0.701  0.053 0.818  0.225 0.635  
2(N,2) 2.346 0.309  0.896 0.639  0.110 0.946  
All statistics are the same as in Table 1 except Avg[(X)] employs the Type-I extreme value distribution rather than 
the normal distribution. The test for heteroscedasticity for Model 1 uses 159, rather than 163, observations. This is 
because four of the fitted probabilities from this model equal zero which means that the denominator of the scaling 
factor used in the auxiliary test regression was also zero. Thus, for these four observations the variables in the auxiliary 
regression could not be calculated and so were excluded. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Full Name of variables 
Legal status of firm Lstatus  
public or private sector of economy  Sector 
ownership of other foreign firms Fcapital 
subcontracting activity Subcon 
export to other Polish regions Qothereg 
export abroad Qexport 
franchising activity Franchis 
adequacy of level of demand Demand 
foreign firms as the major competitors Comp 
technological level of firm's products Techprod 
internet use Internet 
new goods produced in last two years Newgoods 
new methods of production in the last two 
years 
Newmethd 
new organizational forms in last two years Neworg 
new business premises in last two years Newprop 
external financial support Exsupprt 
increase in fixed assets 1998-99 Farise 
intention to increase turnover  Turnover 
Numbers employed in the firm in 1999 Employed 
percentage increase in employment 1998-99. Empgrow 
policy on human capital development Humcap 
Level of average wage in the firm Avewage 
absence of trade unions in the firm Trdunion 
optimism of EU accession upon the firm  Euaffect 
preparation for the EU Eupreprn 
existence of a bank loan in 1988-99 Loan2yrs 
revenue level in 1999 Revenuef 
proportionate change in profits from 1997 to 
1998 
Prgrow98 
number of years of positive profits Profityr 
 
 
